In a recent High Court judgment, Mrs Justice Hill upheld a lower court’s decision refusing to grant a stay of proceedings for mediation in a defamation claim—highlighting the careful balance courts must strike between promoting ADR and ensuring litigation progresses efficiently.
Background to the Case
In Wilson v Stroud Green Housing Co-operative Ltd [2025], the appellant, Mr Dejaun Wilson, issued a defamation claim against his housing co-operative. The dispute arose from an email sent by the head of a tenant-run committee to the local authority, which Mr Wilson alleged defamed him by suggesting safeguarding concerns in relation to his mother. After learning about the email months later, Mr Wilson supported his mother in filing a formal complaint and later issued libel proceedings shortly before the one-year limitation period expired.
Seeking to explore settlement, Mr Wilson applied for a 12-month stay of proceedings to allow for alternative dispute resolution (ADR), specifically to pursue the complaints process. However, Deputy Master Skinner KC refused the stay, ordering instead that Mr Wilson file and serve Particulars of Claim and pay the Respondent’s costs. Mr Wilson’s appeal against that refusal came before Mrs Justice Hill.
The Court’s Approach to ADR Stays
Mr Wilson, representing himself, argued that the Deputy Master had erred in refusing his application, raising grounds that included:
- Mischaracterisation of his application – He argued the judge wrongly treated it as an extension of time, not a proper request for a stay.
- Over-reliance on limitation principles – The Deputy Master had referred to Gatley on Libel and Slander, highlighting the need for swift vindication in libel cases.
- Failure to apply ADR principles in case law – Mr Wilson cited Hamon v UCL, where an eight-month stay for ADR had been granted.
However, Justice Hill rejected these submissions, providing detailed reasoning on why the stay was justifiably refused.
Why the Stay Was Refused
1.
Expedition Matters in Defamation
The court reiterated a key principle in defamation law: speed matters. The one-year limitation period exists because defamation claims concern reputational harm, which should be addressed promptly. A 12-month stay in such a context was, as the Deputy Master put it, “extraordinary.”
Even though the claim had been issued within time, the judge was entitled to view the lack of further progress—such as failing to serve the claim form or Particulars—as a failure to pursue the claim diligently.
2.
No Absolute Right to ADR Stay
While paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct encourages a stay where proceedings are issued before pre-action steps are completed, it does not mandate one. Courts must exercise discretion and consider factors like delay, progress made, and fairness to the other party.
Mrs Justice Hill held that the Deputy Master had properly weighed these factors. The defendant had not yet been informed of the case’s scope and there was no active engagement from them in the complaint process. The court rightly prioritised progress in the litigation over speculative settlement hopes.
3.
Distinguishing from Hamon
The appellant relied heavily on Hamon v UCL, in which an eight-month stay was granted for ADR. However, the High Court distinguished that case on several grounds:
- Hamon involved group litigation and contract claims, which have longer limitation periods.
- It was also at a different procedural stage and involved different strategic dynamics.
Thus, while Hamon reinforced the court’s support for ADR, it was not directly applicable to Mr Wilson’s libel claim.
Encouraging Mediation—But Not at the Expense of Progress
Importantly, the judgment does not signal a retreat from judicial encouragement of ADR. Both the Deputy Master and Mrs Justice Hill acknowledged that parties may still mediate in parallel with proceedings or even apply for a stay later if mediation becomes viable.
But the key message is this: ADR cannot be used to indefinitely postpone progress in litigation, especially where time limits are tight and parties have already delayed.
Implications for Litigants and Mediators
This case offers several lessons:
- Timeliness is crucial, particularly in defamation claims. ADR efforts should not become a reason for procedural inertia.
- Courts are open to mediation, but only where it’s pursued seriously and does not disrupt the orderly progression of the case.
- Self-represented parties must be especially careful in following procedural requirements. Even genuine ADR efforts won’t override the court’s need to manage cases efficiently.
For mediators and lawyers alike, the judgment reinforces that ADR is most effective when it complements litigation—not when it seeks to delay it without a clear prospect of resolution.
Conclusion
The High Court’s refusal to grant a stay for mediation in Wilson is a cautionary tale for litigants who hope to rely on ADR to pause proceedings. Courts remain firmly committed to promoting settlement—but not at the expense of timely justice.
If you’re involved in litigation and considering mediation, ProMediate (UK) Ltd can assist. Our panel of accredited mediators works alongside litigation timetables to help resolve disputes efficiently—before the costs and stress escalate